We consider a continuous time market model, in which agents influence asset prices.
Introduction
In the classical Black-Scholes model and in fact in most other continuous time financial market models it is assumed that agents behavior does not influence asset-prices and all agents possess the same level of information.
These models have been very successfully applied to classical questions such as the pricing of options and derivatives as well as optimal asset allocation. However these models are not suitable to explain how the level of information influences the general performance of the stock market or how and for what price information may be exchanged between individual agents on the market. There is no doubt about that in real world markets agents possess different levels of information and that it is important to understand what value particular pieces of information have and how general welfare is affected by these. In the first part of this article, we set up a continuous time market model in which agents are assumed to influence asset-prices and are exposed to different information flows. The framework is the one of a stochastic differential game with anticipative strategy sets. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash-equilibria for this game and characterize these for various levels of information asymmetry. Furthermore we study the consequences, an increased level of information has on general welfare. Information asymmetry is not a contradiction to the efficient market hypotheses, as the agents may indeed learn all the necessary information by carefully studying the market, if they invest enough effort to do so. However the emphasize here lies on effort. Different agents invest different amounts of effort or capital in order to obtain information, that may enable them to trade more successfully. Information is costly, and in the second part of this article we study the aspect of pricing information within a competetive market. To illustrate this, let us consider the following three scenarios. In scenario 1 a private investors may start buying stocks or funds without knowing anything about the market and not intending to learn anything about it, simply because he has read an advertisement in his local bank. In scenario 2 a private investor is strongly engaged in monitoring his individual portfolio, buying financial newspapers, investing time to watch business channels etc. Finally, in scenario 3, a big company who represents a significant market player may invest large sums in hiring a consulting company, which essentially provides it with key information on the market.
All three scenarios present different aspects under which information may be traded between market players. In the first scenario the exchange of information is costless for the investor while the bank bears costs due to the advertisement campaign. Obviously there is a matter of trust here, but we leave this issue aside. In scenario 2 the investor invests money and time to obtain information on the market, essentially to trade more successfully and outperform other market participants. The exchange of information in this case is costly for the private investor, while the seller of information, i.e. financial press, media, but also financial institutions, which often provides media with important information on their business strategies, gain from this sale. The situation in the third scenario is very similar as in the second one, as long as the investor is concerned. Here again, the investor invests to obtain information from the consulting company, the exchange of information is costly. There is a significant difference in this scenario however, and this reflects the point of view of the seller of information. While in the second example the private investor is assumed to be a price taker and has no influence on market prices, a major company which owns large portfolios represents a trader, which has market impact and may influence market prices due to the mechanisms of supply and demand. The consulting company, which is also engaged on the market, must bear in mind the consequences that giving information to a large trader may change prices and therefore affect the value of their own portfolios, when considering whether or not and for which price to sell information. The first example more or less represents a problem in finding the right advertisement strategy for the bank and can be addressed in the general context of advertisement. A situation as described in scenario 2 has been addressed in continuous time diffusion-type market models, complete and incomplete, by various authors, for example Karatzas and Pikovsky (1996), Corcuera (2004) , Imkeller (2003) , Leon et al. (2003) and Ewald (2005) . In this context the value of additional information is determined from the point of view of a representative uninformed agent. This agent would buy the information for any price P such that
where π * andπ * denote the optimal portfolios under additional resp. no additional information. Here u denotes expected utility from terminal wealth while x resp. x − P denote the different levels of initial wealth. The owner of the information would sell for any price, as he does not fear for any consequences on the market. Any positive price offer for the information would give an incentive to sell, and in the presence of many possible information providers bring the sellers-price down to zero. In the third example, and this is the situation on which we focus in this article, the situations is more complex, as the seller of the information must take the buyers market impact into account. Selling information comes with the risk that the buyer may use the information in a way, that market prices change to the disadvantage of the seller. This situation has not been studied before in a continuous time diffusion-type financial market model. The framework we consider is most general. We study a market model in which two agents use information flows modeled by filtrations G 1 and G 2 in order to buy or sell assets, whose prices they may influence depending on their current position in the market. These filtrations are assumed to satisfy the usual conditions, see Karatzas-Schreve (1988) page 10. The technical framework of the second part of this article is an extension of the market game studied in the first part, including two initial stages in which information can be traded for monetary units. We solve for the Nash-equilibria of this game and in this way determine competitive prices for the pieces of information sold. In both cases, extended and original market game, agents face continuous time investment decisions. Trading strategies need to be integrated with respect to price processes in order to compute returns. In diffusion type models integration with respect to price processes is essentially the same as integration with respect to Brownian motion. The standard stochastic integral, which is the Itô-integral, does not allow the integrand to depend on more information than revealed by the Brownian motion itself. In our framework, where agents have asymmetric information, which may exceed the level of information revealed by the underlying Brownian motion, the Itô integral is to restrictive. In order to avoid these problems we use an anticipative stochastic calculus which has been developed in the last two decades. We use the technical framework based on the forward integral as found in Kohatsu-Higa and Sulem (2006) . In order to provide analytically tractable examples we also make use of the classical technique of enlargement of filtration, developed originally by Jacod (1985) which is nowadays used throughout the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. We give a short introduction on anticipative stochastic calculus in section 2 while in section 3 we set up our market model and compute Nash-equilibrium strategies. In this section we also study the question, how these equilibria change with respect to changes in the information level and how general welfare is affected by this. In section 4
we extend the game with a pre-stage in which information may be exchanged in return for monetary units and determine equilibrium prices for the information. Section 5 contains the main conclusions from the paper.
A brief review of anticipative stochastic calculus
In this section we introduce some preliminaries about the anticipative stochastic calculus, which in fact is strongly related to what is called the Malliavin calculus. A standard reference for this is Nualart (1995) . Let us consider the set S of cylindrical functionals F : Ω → R, given by F = f (W(t 1 ), ..., W(t l ))
where f ∈ C ∞ b (R n ) l is a smooth function with bounded derivatives of all orders and (W(t)) denotes an n-dimensional Brownian motion on Ω. We define the Malliavin derivative operator on S via
were ∂f ∂x i denotes the gradient of f with respect to its i-th n-dimensional argument. This operator and the iterated operators D k are closable and 
. The adjoint of the Malliavin derivative operator D : D 1,2 → L 2 (Ω × [0, T ], R n ) is called the Skorohod integral and denoted with δ. This operator has the property that its domain contains the class L 2 a (Ω × [0, T ], R n ) of square integrable adapted stochastic processes and its restriction to this class coincides with the Itôintegral. We will make use of the notation δ(u) = T 0 u t dW t . Malliavin derivative operator and Skorohod integral are related by the following integration by parts formula
The following proposition is used to calculate the logarithmic derivative, often called information drift in information theory. It will prove particularly useful in our examples in the next section. The result is well known in the case where the underlying process X is a Brownian motion. Even though this is precisely the case which we refer to in our application ,we include a more general result here, where X is assumed to be general time-homogeneous diffusion. This proves to be useful in the framework of stochastic volatility models, where additional information is determined by the level of volatility in the future, see for example Ewald (2005) .
where W(t) is a 1-dim Brownian motion. We assume that the transition density p(t, u, x, y) is two times continuously differentiable with respect to x and one time continuously differentiable with respect to t. * Theñ
Proof. Let f be a smooth function and M be an F s -adapted random variable.
Because M is adapted to F s , we haveD u M = 0 for u > s. Applying first the product rule to to M f (y)p(u, T 0 , X(u), y)dy) and then Fubini's theorem we obtain
It follows from the Itô formula that
From the Kolmogorov backward equation we can conclude that the expression in the square brackets is zero. Furthermore D u p(s, X(s), y) = 0 for the reason that u ≥ s implies that p(s, X(s), y) is F u adapted. We therefore obtain that
Applying the Malliavin derivative operator on the expression in the square brackets leads according to Nualart (1995 
Using the Fubini theorem to interchange the order of integration and taking expectations inside the integral and furthermore realizing that the expectation of an Itô integral with respect to Brownian motion is always zero, we obtain that
Another application of Fubini's theorem and the fact that for a positive differ-
By definition of the transition density function we conclude that
Now, by definition ofW(t) the last equality is equivalent to
is therefore a continuous martingale with respect to the filtration G. Its quadratic variation is given by <W(t) >= t for t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence, by Lévy's theorem we have that W (t)
We can then explicitly write down the transition
Then
In the following section we will use the so called forward integral which allows us more flexibility in the choice of stochastic integrands. For details see for example Russo and Valois (1993) .
if the limit exists in probability.
The forward integral is related to the Skorohod integral in the following
where · denotes the euclidean matrix norm. Moreover, assume that T r(D t + ϕ(t))
A proof of this result can be found for example Russo and Valois (1993) or Kohatsu-Higa and Sulem (2006) . Taking into account that the expectation of a Skorohod integral always vanishes, we obtain
Furthermore it can be shown that if ϕ is forward integrable and càglàd (i.e. left continuous with left limits) and ∆ := {0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t n = T } is a sequence of partitions such that ∆ n := sup i=0,··· ,n−1
if the limit exists in probability. Taken the latter into account one can indeed argue that the forward integral is predestined to model financial markets in continuous time when allowing trading strategies to depend on a more general information structure. It also follows from the latter equation, that in case that W remains a semi-martingale when changing the filtration, then the forward integral coincides with the Itô-integral for semi-martingales.
Continuous time market games with heterogeneous information
We consider a market with a finite time horizon [0, T ] and agents which are heterogeneously informed. For simplicity we restrict the number of agents to two. Our analysis however can easily be modified to model the case of arbitrary many agents. Assets include one riskless asset, which we call bond and denote with B(t), as well as n risky assets, which we think of stocks and denote with S i (t). The different levels of information are modeled by using four different filtrations consecutively throughout the remaining of this paper. These are G 1 = (G 1 t ) for agent number one, G 2 = (G 2 t ) for agent number two, F = (F t ) the σ-algebra generated by the underlying noise process, which we assume to be a Brownian motion W(t), and finally the filtration G = (G t ) for the coefficients of the underlying model. We
The latter relationship guarantees that even though agents may have different level of information, they both understand how the market works and how other agents behavior affects the market. At the current moment we do not impose any further relationships between G 1 and G 2 . The agents investments are described by their individual portfolio processes π p = π i p (t) 1≤i≤n , where π i p (t) denotes the proportion of wealth of agent p which at time t is invested in stock i = 1, ...k, while the remaining portion π 0 p (t) is assumed to be invested in the bond. We will later model the process of selling pieces of information from one agent to the other.
In order that the selling agent is not indifferent to giving away information to the other agent for free, we need to assume that the agents behavior affects asset-prices. More precisely we assume the following dynamics for assets:
with diag(S(t)) the n × n-matrix with S i (t) as diagonal elements and zeros elsewhere. We assume that the following conditions hold for the coefficients:
The chosen dynamics (7) incorporates a supply and demand feature, in which agents current positions influence the drift term of the asset-prices.
A similar dynamic for the case of a representative agent has been used in Kohatsu-Higa and Sulem (2006) . We denote with X p (t, π 1 , π 2 ) the discounted wealth process corresponding to agent p given chosen investment strategies π 1 and π 2 . The wealth processes also depend on the initial endowments of the agents, but for the moment we omit this from the notation. The stochastic differential equation governing the evolution of the wealth processes is given by
with initial condition X p (0) = x p . Note that this equation presents a stochastic differential equation with anticipating coefficients. Nevertheless, the Itô formula for the forward integral (see Russo and Vallois (2000) implies that 8
is satisfied by
For technical reasons we have to impose certain restriction on our portfolio strategies which guarantee that the solution above is well defined.
Definition 2.
We call a pair of portfolio strategies (π 1 , π 2 ) admissible and write (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ A if the following conditions are satisfied:
For any bounded càglàd processπ s.t.π ⊤ (t)σ(t) is forward integrable there exists γ > 0 such that the families {|M 1 (T, π 1 + ǫπ, π 2 )|} 0≤ǫ≤γ and
Here J πp µ (s) is the Jacobian matrix of µ with respect to π p evaluated at time s.
We assume that our agents are risk averse and that their objective is to maximize expected utility from discounted terminal wealth. In order to obtain analytically tractable results we use logarithmic utility. Taking this into account, the payoffs for the agents in our market game are given by
for p = 1, 2. We note that the payoff's u p also depend on the initial endowments x 1 and x 2 but omit this in our notation. In this setup the optimization objective for both agents is identical and therefore asymmetry effects concerning the level of risk averseness are left out in our discussion. The asymmetry arising in our model comes from the fact that the strategies of the individual players rely on different information and that they may effect the market in different ways. We consider the market to be in equilibrium if the strategy pair (π * 1 , π * 2 ) ∈ A constitutes a Nash-equilibrium, i.e.
with A 1 (π * 2 ) = {π 1 |(π 1 , π * 2 ) ∈ A} and A 2 (π * 1 ) = {π 2 |(π * 1 , π 2 ) ∈ A}. The following theorem provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the existence of a Nash-equilibrium for the market game above in terms of a martingale condition. Theorem 1. Under the assumptions stated in the preceding paragraph we have that 1. if (π * 1 , π * 2 ) constitutes a Nash-equilibrium for the market game, then M p (t, π * 1 , π * 2 ) for t ∈ [0, T ] is a martingale with respect to the filtration G p for p = 1, 2.
2. If (π * 1 , π * 2 ) ∈ A and M (t, π * 1 , π * 2 ), t ∈ [0, T ] is a martingale with respect to the filtration G p and u p (π 1 , π 2 ) is concave with respect to π p for p = 1, 2 resp., then (π * 1 , π * 2 ) constitutes a Nash-equilibrium of the market game.
Proof.
1. If (π * 1 , π * 2 ) constitutes a Nash-equilibrium for the market game, then for bounded θ 1 as in Definition 2 part 3, we have
for all ǫ in an open neighborhood of 0. This implies that the partial directional derivative of u 1 along the direction θ 1 evaluated at π * 1 is zero, i.e.,
We notice that the differentiation and the integral can be interchanged because our admissibility definition implies that {|M 1 (T, π * 1 + ǫθ 1 , π * 2 )|} 0≤ǫ≤γ is uniformly integrable. Let us now consider the particular process θ 1 (u) = θ(t)1 (t,t+h] (u), h > 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where θ(t) is a bounded, R nvalued and G 1 t -measurable random variable. Thus, (13) can be written as
Since (14) holds for all such θ we conclude
Using the definition of M p (t, π 1 , π 2 ) we obtain:
An analogous argumentation using u 2 (π * 1 , π * 2 ) ≥ u 2 (π * 1 , π * 2 + ǫθ 2 ) establishes:
From (16) and (17), we infer that M p (t, π * 1 , π * 2 ) is a G p -martingale for p = 1, 2.
2. Let us now assume that there exists a pair (π * 1 , π * 2 ) such that M 1 (t, π * 1 , π * 2 ) is a G 1 -martingale and M 2 (t, π 1 , π 2 ) a G 2 -martingale. Therefore (16) and (17) hold simultaneously. Let us consider the optimization problem for agent 1. (16) implies that (15) holds, hence (14) holds for θ(t) bounded R n -valued and G 1 measurable. Inductively we see that (13) holds for processes of the form
with θ 1 (t i ) bounded, R n -valued and G 1 t i -measurable random variables. Here we use the equality
We obtain that (13) is true for all simple processesθ 1 (u) and a density argument establishes that (13) holds for all processes θ 1 as in Definition 2 part 3. This implies d dǫ u 1 (π 1 + ǫθ 1 , π 2 )| ǫ=0 = 0.
On the other hand, using that u p (π 1 , π 2 ) is concave in each π p we obtain
Taking the limit for ǫ → 0, and taking into account that lim ǫ→0
1 , π * 2 )) = 0, as the latter is basically the directional derivative of u 1 along π * 1 , which by (18) must be zero, we obtain that 0 ≥ u 1 (θ 1 , π * 2 ) − u 1 (π * 1 , π * 2 ). As θ 1 can be chosen within the set A 1 (π * 2 ) we obtain by formally setting θ 1 = π 1 that
Analogously we obtain u 2 (π * 1 , π * 2 ) ≥ u 2 (π * 1 , π 2 ) for all π 2 ∈ A 2 (π * 1 ).
This means (π * 1 , π * 2 ) is a Nash-equilibrium for the market game.
In the following we discuss how we can use the criterion presented in Theorem 1 in order to identify Nash-equilibria for our market game with heterogeneous information.
Lemma 1. Assume that (π * 1 , π * 2 ) is a Nash-equilibrium for our market game. Then the process ǫ → E t+ǫ t σ(u)d − W(u)|G p t has absolutely continuous paths for p = 1, 2 and the derivative
exist a.s. for p = 1, 2. Furthermore the following equation holds for p = 1, 2
Under the concavity assumption for the utilities in Theorem 1 part 2 condition (22) is a sufficient condition for a pair (π * 1 , π * 2 ) ∈ A to constitute a Nashequilibrium.
Proof. These statements follow from equation (15) when dividing the latter by h and taking the limit for h → 0, Theorem 1 and Definition 2.
For the choice of µ, various specifications appear to be reasonable. However to obtain a tractable dynamics and analytical results we focus on the linear form µ(t, π 1 , π 2 ) = µ(t) + a(t)π 1 + b(t)π 2
For the general case the latter should be considered as a first order approximation. In order to satisfy condition 1 on page 13 we need to assume that the processes µ(t),a(t),b(t) are G-adapted. In order to apply the second part of Theorem 1 it is important to note that under our assumptions a sufficient criterion for concavity of u p (π 1 , π 2 ) is the following:
ues in the set of negative definite matrices
The latter assumption can be interpreted in a way that the influences of both agents's portfolio strategies on expected returns are embedded in the noise. Otherwise, the agents may drive the stock prices arbitrarily high just by buying and selling large volumes to obtain a high return. Obviously embedded does not mean without effect. We will assume from now on that Assumption 1 is satisfied. For notational reasons let us define the matrix valued function
Using this specification we obtain the following characterization of a Nashequilibrium.
Proposition 2. If the following system of equations
admits a solution (π * 1 , π * 2 ) ∈ A then (π * 1 , π * 2 ) constitutes a Nash-equilibrium of our market game.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 1, noticing that J π 1 µ = a(t), J π 2 µ = b(t) and that all coefficients are measurable with respect to G p t , p = 1, 2.
To better understand how the equilibrium strategies are constructed, we study how they change, while changing the complexity of the model, starting with the standard Black-Scholes model, in which we have standard information and no market impact, i.e. G p t = F t for t ∈ [0, T ] and a(t) = b(t) = 0. In this case I 1 (t) = I 2 (t) = 0 as the expectation of an Ito-integral is always zero and therefore the equilibrium strategies are just the Merton rule. If we allow for market impact but no non-standard information, we will still have that I 1 (t) = I 2 (t) = 0, however the equilibrium strategies now adjust for the actions of the opponent. In this case agents have complete information about the opponents strategies and the Nash-equilibrium is given by
Now, in the presence of nonstandard, possibly asymmetric information two things occur. First, the agents are no longer able to fully reflect on their opponents strategy and instead have to take expectations based on their current level of information. This accounts to taking conditional expectations in Proposition 2. Furthermore the additional terms I p (t) occur. These can be interpreted as information drifts and adjust the strategy for a differently perceived growth rate of the underlying asset.
The particular form of the equilibrium strategies in Proposition 2 is implicit and has been chosen in order to understand how agents react and adjust for their opponents strategies. Substituting the formula for π * 2 (t) into the formula for π * 1 (t) and vice versa it is possible to obtain an explicit form. Note that in order to obtain explicit formulas for the strategies it is only necessary to give explicit formulas for the conditional expectations on the right hand side of the expressions in Proposition 2. Such expressions are derived in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume that (π * 1 , π * 2 ) constitutes a Nash-equilibrium of our market game. Then the conditional expectations E (π * 1 (t)| G 2 t ) and E (π * 2 (t)| G 1 t ) in Proposition 2 are explicitly given by the following formulas
the information drift of the individual agents as perceived by the opposite agent.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 2 by substituting the equation for π * 2 (t)
into the equation for π * 1 (t) and vice versa and then take conditional expectations on G 1 t resp. G 2 t .
For the case of nonstandard homogeneous information we obtain the following Corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume that both agents have the same level of information, i.e. G 1 = G 2 . If the following system of equations
with I(t) = I 1 (t) = I 2 (t) admits a solution (π * 1 , π * 2 ) ∈ A then (π * 1 , π * 2 ) constitutes a Nash-equilibrium for the corresponding market game.
Proof. Symmetry of information implies that the the conditional expectation in Proposition 2 can be replaced by the actual strategies. Furthermore from the definition it is clear that I 1 (t) = I 2 (t).
In the case above explicit solutions can be obtained simply by substituting the expression for π * 2 resp. π * 1 into π * 1 resp. π * 2 and solving out. Let us now assume that the agents do not only have the same level of information, but also that the market impact of both agents is the same. This relates to choosing a(t) = b(t). In this case we are particularly interested in symmetric Nash-equilibria.
Corollary 2. Under symmetric information and same market impact factors
a(t) = b(t) a symmetric Nash-equilibrium (π * , π * ) of our market game is given by π * (t) = 1 − Σ −1 (a(t))a(t) −1 · Σ −1 (a(t))(µ(t) − r(t) + I(t))
In the following we study the welfare implications of information in our market game. By welfare implications we mainly mean, whether the market is better of with more information or not. Ewald (2005) the answer to this question is trivial : Yes! In our framework the analysis however is different, in the way that given more information the agents may be able to outperform and in fact harm each other, with more severe consequences. We will derive explicit conditions on the model parameters which determine whether general welfare is improved or worsened by adding more information. In order to proceed with this we need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 2.
Assume that a Nash-equilibrium for our market game exists. Then t 0 σ(s)d − W(s) is a G p semi-martingale for p = 1, 2. Furthermore, if additionally, the matrix valued process σ(s) is invertible a.s. then W is a G p -semimartingale.
Proof. Under our assumption that the process σ(s) is G-adapted we obtain that the forward integral
By separating the positive and negative parts of the integrands in the conditional expectation, the latter can clearly be written as the difference of two non-decreasing G p -adapted processes. On the other side it follows from Proposition 1 and (10) that M p (t, π 1 , π 2 ) is a continuous martingale. According to Definition 3.1. in Karatzas-Schreve (1988) t 0 σ(s)d − W(s) is therefore a continuous semi martingale.
For the following discussion we assume G = F. Let us consider a filtra-
Denote Nash-equilibria of our market game corresponding to the setup G 1 = G = G 2 with (π * 1 ,π * 2 ) and Nashequilibria corresponding to the setup G 1 = H = G 2 with (π * 1 , π * 2 ).
Definition 3.
The information H = (H t ) is welfare increasing, if the payoffs from (π * 1 , π * 2 ) Pareto-dominate the payoffs from (π * 1 ,π * 2 ). H is called welfare decreasing if the opposite is the case. Furthermore we define the information welfare impact of H as the vector
Clearly the information welfare impact does not depend on the initial wealth and information is welfare increasing if both components are positive and welfare decreasing if both components are negative. We have the following proposition, which provides necessary and sufficient conditions depending on the various parameters of the game, whether or not information is welfare increasing.
Proposition 4. Writing W(t) =Ŵ(t) −
t 0 α(s)ds according to Lemma 2 witĥ W(t) an H-Brownian motion and using the notation
the two components of the information welfare impact of H are explicitly given
Using Corollary 1 we can easily derive the following two equations for the equilibrium strategy (π * 1 , π * 2 ) under information H:
The equilibrium strategies without additional information are given by the market impact adjusted Merton-rules:
Substitution of these strategies in the utility function leads to the following expression for the first component of iwi(H) 
for any bounded function g. Using this relationship it can be verified that the long expression above simplifies to
The analysis of the second component is completely analogous.
The expressions for the information wellfare impact are quite lengthy. For the one dimensional case we are able to derive the following corollary. 
and welfare decreasing if
Proof. Under the assumptions in the corollary it is easy to verify that the components of the information wellfare impact vector in Proposition 4 simplify to
The information is welfare increasing if both components of this vector are positive and welfare decreasing if both components are negative. Obviously we have that E t 0 α 2 (t)dt ≥ 0. The condition for positivity resp. negativity is therefore exactly the one stated in the corollary.
The corollary above specifies a certain region of the parameter space consisting of feasible parameters (a, b, σ 2 ) in which information is wellfare increasing. The following figure shows this region for the the example of initially enlarged filtration. Note that some of the points in the welfare increasing region may not satisfy the concavity condition, which in this case would correspond to 2 max{a, b} ≤ σ 2 . However the concavity condition is not necessary for the existence of Nash-equilibria, which in our definition of welfare increasing is implicitly assumed. It is worth to mention though, that in general the intersection between those points in the welfare increasing region and those points which satisfy the concavity condition is not empty.
In order to demonstrate how our results apply to the classical case of enlarged initial filtration we include the following example.
Example 2. Let us study the implications of the various statements above
for the case of initially enlarged filtration.
Consider for
. . , ν p kp for p = 1, 2 are subsets of {1, . . . , n}. Denote the intersection {ν 1 1 , . . . , ν 1 k 1 } ∩ {ν 2 1 , . . . , ν 2 k 2 } with {ν 1 , . . . , ν t }. This set may possibly be empty. We have that
As indicated before, in this case an explicit solution can be obtained by substitution of the second strategy in the first one and vice versa and solving out.
Trading of information
In the preceding section we studied how different levels of information affect the equilibrium of the market. While it was assumed that agents have different levels of information, they were not supposed to exchange and share their private information. In this section we will extend our market model in the way that agents are allowed to sell there own private information to their opponent and/or buy the private information of their opponent. For this reason we extend our original game, which represents a continuous time sequential game, by two additional stages, which occur before agents invest into the market. For matters of simplicity we only treat the case where one of the agents, say agent 1, is better informed than the other agent, i.e. G 2 t ⊂ G 1 t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In the first stage agent one announces a price P for which he would be willing to sell the information G 1 to his opponent. In the second stage agent 2 decides whether to buy or not to buy the information offered for the price announced by agent 1. If agent 2 decides to buy information he faces two consequences. First his initial wealth is lowered by the amount he has to pay for the information. Second in order to trade on the market and choose a portfolio, agent 2 can now make use of the increased level of information, which is then represented by the information flow G 1 rather than G 2 . From the perspective of agent 1 the situation looks as follows: If he sells the information, his initial wealth will be raised by the amount he charges for this information, but he faces as a consequence, that his opponent is now able to use the increased level of information to decide on his individual investment strategy. In a model where agents behavior does not influence asset-prices, the latter would not really lead to consequences and agent 1 would be willing to give away information for free. However, in a model where prices are not determined exogenously, the seller of information has to fear, that the buyer of information may use this information in a way that affects asset-prices to his disadvantage. Summarizing, there are two factors which have to be taken into account in our extended market game when determining the equilibrium and the equilibrium price for the information.
1. buying information for price P lowers initial wealth from x to x − P but provides the buyer with increased level of information, which he may use to improve his investment strategy and obtaining a higher expected return 2. selling information for price P increases initial wealth from x to x + P but the agent has to face possible consequences on his own optimal investment strategy and expected return due to the increased level of information of his opponent Both agents have to weigh up the benefits and losses in order to make up their decisions. In this article we assume that agents behave non-cooperatively.
Alternatively, agents may be willing to share their information at the beginning, setup a mutual investment fund and then share the profits at the end.
The main question, how to distribute the profits at the end, is studied by means of cooperative game theory and the Nash-bargaining approach in our working paper Ewald-Yajun (2007) .
Definition 4.
A price P * is called an equilibrium price for the information H = (H t ), if the sequential game described above with the choice of G 1 = H has a Nash-equilibrium of the type
The definition above guarantees that if the information is offered at the equilibrium price it will indeed be traded at that price. In the following we compute equilibrium prices for the case that agent 1 is better informed but doesn't necessarily have the same market impact. This is the typical setup when a consulting company sells their information and expertise to a client which presents a major market maker. Criteria one and two above still apply for this setup. In order to solve our extended market game we apply backward induction. In the previous section we studied the third stage and have identified equilibrium strategies for general levels of information.
We found that the equilibrium strategies do not depend on initial wealth.
This feature depends on our choice of utility function as the logarithm, but is also observed with other utility functions such as exponential utility. Note however that even though the equilibrium strategies are unaffected by the initial wealth, the amount of utility obtained from following these strategies does. Using this fact we find that in the last stage two scenarios are possible.
Scenario one occurs, if information is traded within the first two stages. In this case both players have the same level of information G 1 in the last sage.
We denote the equilibrium strategies for the corresponding sub-game starting in stage 3 with (π * 1 , π * 2 ). If information is not traded within the first two periods, then agents posses asymmetric information in the third stage. In this case we denote the equilibrium for the corresponding sub-game with (π * 1 ,π * 2 ). These equilibria can be computed with the methods presented in the previous section.
Proposition 5. Let P * be a solution of the following system u x 2 −P * 2 (π * 1 , π * 2 ) = u x 2 2 (π * 1 ,π * 2 ) u x 1 +P * 1 (π * 1 , π * 2 ) ≥ u x 1 1 (π * 1 ,π * 2 ).
Here the upper indices at the utilities denote the agents initial endowment.
Then P * is an equilibrium price for the information G 1 in the extended market game illustrated above. In particular an equilibrium price is unique.
Proof. This follows mainly from the discussion above and the definition of an equilibrium price. As maximal expected utility depends monotonically increasing on initial wealth and the price P * of the information is added to agents 1 initial wealth x 1 , agent 1 is trying to set the price as high a possible.
Agent 2 has to wager whether to buy or not to buy the information for this price. Obtaining more information raises his maximum expected utility, but the price of the information P * is subtracted from his initial wealth. The first equality in Proposition 5 sets the price in a way that agent 2 is indifferent about buying or not buying. Even though agent 2 would be willing to buy for a price which satisfies the first equality, it is not a priori clear that agent 1 would sell for this price, as he has to wager the consequence of having an opponent on the market which is better informed than original, against the immediate prospect of more initial wealth. This decision is reflected by the inequality in Proposition 5. Using these arguments it then follows from backward induction that ({P * , π * 1 } , { "buy only if price ≤ P * ", π * 2 }) is a sequential Nash-equilibrium and therefore that P * is an equilibrium price. Definition 5. The price P * is called a feasible price if u x 2 −P * 2 (π * 1 , π * 2 ) ≥ u x 2 2 (π * 1 ,π * 2 ) u x 1 +P * 1 (π * 1 , π * 2 ) ≥ u x 1 1 (π * 1 ,π * 2 ).
By Definition an equilibrium price is feasible. Feasibility of a price ensures that information is traded under this price, however the selling agent may perform suboptimal. In the presence of many information providers, feasible prices other than the equilibrium price may occur. It is straightforward to verify that the two inequalities in Definition 5 are equivalent to the following two inequalities areas. The ask price represents the minimum price for which the informed agent would be willing to sell the information, the offer price is the maximum price the uninformed agent would be willing to pay for the information. The feasible price region is indicated with dots. We see that for the case where the non-informed agent has no market impact, the informed agent would actually be willing to give the information away for free. 
Conclusion
We have studied a continuous time financial market game in which agents possess different levels of information within an anticipative stochastic calculus framework. Technically our game represents an anticipative stochastic differential game. To the best of our knowledge such games have not been studied before. We derived necessary and sufficient conditions for the ex- istence of Nash-equilibria in this game and studied the impact the level of information has on the Nash-equilibria and on general wellfare. In the second part we extended the game with two pre-stages in which information can be traded among the agents. The question of pricing information has so far only been studied in a representative agent framework. We introduced the notion of an equilibrium price for specified information and derive a certain set of inequalities which characterize it. Various examples for the case of initially enlarged filtration are given.
